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ABSTRACT
A NEAT Approach to Malware Classification
by Jason Do
Current malware detection software often relies on machine learning, which is
seen as an improvement over signature-based techniques. Problems with a machine
learning based approach can arise when malware writers modify their code with the
intent to evade detection. This leads to a cat and mouse situation where new models
must constantly be trained to detect new malware variants. In this research, we
experiment with genetic algorithms as a means of evolving machine learning models to
detect malware. Genetic algorithms, which simulate natural selection, provide a way
for models to adapt to continuous changes in a malware families, and thereby improve
detection rates. Specifically, we use the Neuro-Evolution of Augmenting Topologies
(NEAT) algorithm to optimize machine learning classifiers based on decision trees and
neural networks. We compare the performance of our NEAT approach to standard
models, including random forest and support vector machines.
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As the Internet grows to be an integral part of human society, so too does malware
grow in response. Over 50 million malware samples were detected in 2019 [1], and this
total increases every year. It can be said that malware is just as much a part of our
daily experience as the Internet is. Hence, malware detection is a critically important
topic in computer security.
Today, malware detection relies on finding and classifying the signatures of
common malware threats. By searching for these signatures in software, most viruses
can be found and disposed of before any major harm can occur. However, viruses that
can mask or change their signature will be essentially invisible to signature-based anti-
virus (AV) tools [2]. Because of this, virus writers have developed various techniques
to hide or alter signatures [3]. For example, metamorphic malware changes its internal
structure—and hence its signature—when it propagates [4]. Although few effective
metamorphic viruses have been seen in the field, the threat posed by such malware
remains real.
Machine learning techniques, such as support vector machines [5], have proven
useful for defending against malware that evolves over time. However, such machine
learning models must be updated regularly to detect new variants, even within the
same malware family [6]. We propose to use genetic algorithms to deal with this
malware evolution problem. Genetic algorithms will enable our malware detection
techniques to evolve and adapt in ways that mimic natural selection [7].
In this research, we consider using genetic algorithms to optimize the training of
several machine learning classifiers, such as decision trees and neural networks. Our
goal is to determine whether this pairing is possible, and if it results in models that
perform comparably to popular malware classification systems currently used. We
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perform various experiments measuring classification accuracy and run time complexity.
These experiments include cross validation in classifying between malware families
and hyperparameter tuning to optimize our model’s run time. Our aim is to create a
malware classification system that can evolve in response to attempts made to evade
detection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of current malware detection methods, genetic algorithms, previous work,
as well as the specific genetic algorithm used in this project. Chapter 3 covers the
methodology of this research, including feature extraction, proposed experiments, and
the machine learning pipeline. Chapter 4 covers implementation details, such as the
data sets used, programming specifications, and experimental design. In Chapter 5, we
present and analyze the results obtained from our experiments. Finally, in Chapter 6,




In this chapter, we first discuss several machine learning techniques that will
be used as a baseline for comparing our research to. We will then provide a brief
introduction into the main topic of our research, genetic algorithms. We also discuss
previous work in the field of malware detection using genetic algorithms, and how
that has influenced our research. Finally, we provide an in depth look into the main
algorithm in our research, the Neuro-Evolution of Augmenting Topologies.
Popular commercial methods of classifying malware primarily rely on signature-
based malware detection [8]. This requires scanning known malware staples and
identifying key, repeated patterns in the code, known as the signature. Should this
pattern be discovered in any other file, it is highly likely that the file contains that
specific type of malware. This technique excels when dealing with previously seen
threats, as large libraries of known signatures can be compiled and cross-referenced
with ease. However, in the case of new viruses, or even old malware edited to mask
the signature, performance can drop significantly [9].
Currently, malware detection techniques have become more sophisticated, and
have turned to machine learning as a method of combating the ever evolving issue of
malware. A recent survey covers several machine learning models used in state of the
art research for malware detection [10]. There are several advantages of using machine
learning to tackle this problem, such as using data from known threats to detect new
malware and scaling up detection for situations involving big data. However, the same
issues can cause machine learning models to fail, requiring the retraining of models
on new data, which can become expensive. Several techniques outlined in the survey
include support vector machines and random forest classifiers, which we use in our
research as base models for comparison.
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2.1 Base Models for Comparison
Recently, machine learning has been used to detect unknown malware with great
success. By allowing machines to learn hidden patterns that are invisible to the
human eye, virus writers will have a harder time changing the code to avoid detection.
The following subsections discuss popular machine learning algorithms for malware
classification. These classifiers will serve as the base models upon which we will
compare the performance of our proposed system.
2.1.1 Decision Trees
Decision trees are one of the simplest classifiers available for use. Essentially,
decision trees involve answering a series of questions based on the features of the
sample being classified [11]. The root node of the decision tree is the initial question
that branches into further decisions. The nodes and branches form the tree structure
that gives this classifier its name. By following the branches from the answers given,
a final decision is made on the sample’s class based on a majority of training samples
that ended up at the same leaf node.
2.1.2 Random Forest
While decision trees are easy to understand, they are often vulnerable to overfitting
on the training data. Random forest classifiers combat this by employing multiple
decision trees and taking a majority vote on the final classification [12]. The decision
trees are often minimal in complexity, but the nodes and decision thresholds are
randomized. By relying on an ensemble of these randomized decision trees, the
classifier improves as a whole.
2.1.3 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines (SVM) focuses on plotting all data points in space and
finding a separating hyperplane that can divide the data into two classes [13]. By
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using the kernel trick to transform the data into a higher dimensional space, it becomes
easier to find the hyperplane and maximize the margin between the two classes. This
allows for a more generalized classifier while minimizing classification error. Previous
work has found that SVMs can perform extremely well in classifying malware [5].
2.2 Genetic Algorithms
Despite the progress made in the field of machine learning based malware detection,
in general, most models still require retraining on new samples when malware evolves
and changes its structure. In the future, this cost can add up and become infeasible
to upkeep. It may become necessary to have a way for models to naturally evolve in
response to the changing malware and adapt to detect new strains. This would lessen
the cost of having to train a new model from scratch every time malware families
mutate.
We propose using genetic algorithms to simulate this evolution. Genetic algo-
rithms allow for random mutations and changes in the weights and structure of the
model itself, and favors the changes that improve performance [7]. The topic of genetic
algorithms is heavily inspired by Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection and
the concept of survival of the fittest. In nature, any slight advantage a creature gets
from their parent’s genes or a slight mutation can slowly push that individual to be
fitter than its peers. Naturally, these advantages would allow it more opportunities
to propagate and pass on its genes to the next generation. Applying these notions
to the field of computer science can hopefully create classification models that can
evolve in response to the malware’s evolution. To accomplish this, genetic algorithms
employ four key factors: fitness, speciation, crossover, and mutation.
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2.2.1 Fitness
The most important aspect of genetic algorithms would be determining which
models perform better than others. Many models will be operating in parallel to solve
the problem, and there needs to be a way to determine which model is the most fit.
This necessitates the definition of a fitness function which can evaluate the performance
of each model such that the best performing models are easily distinguished. In terms
of malware classification, fitness can be measured as simply as the validation accuracy
of the model, to something as complex as dynamically rewarding correct and incorrect
classification, or even some combination of different factors. The goal is to define a
fitness function that will push the model to evolve towards a desirable solution.
2.2.2 Speciation
Another concept of genetic algorithms is that of speciation. In nature, animals
that are similar enough to each other are classified as a single species, and evolve within
their group. A single species can branch out to become multiple different species,
and species unfit for their environment can go extinct. Genetic algorithms apply this
concept to machine learning models by representing them as genomes. A genome is
an encoding of the model in a comparable and mutable way. Similar genomes are
classified as a single species while dissimilar genomes are separate. Because of this, a
way to distinguish the genes of each classifier is necessary to compare genomes. This
will heavily depend on the type of classifier that is used. For example, a population of
neural networks might compare the number of nodes and connections shared between
them, and a decision tree classifier may simply compare the features and values for
each decision node. Individuals within a species will compete among themselves, while
mostly leaving other species alone. This will promote diversity in the population, as
unique solutions will less likely be dominated by a singular strategy.
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2.2.3 Crossover
Crossover determines the process of how two different genomes can reproduce to
create a new genome of the next generation. In nature, the fittest specimens reproduce
the most, and the same goes for genetic algorithms. If less fit models were allowed
to reproduce freely, the model could stagnate and never reach an optimal solution.
To avoid this, the fittest members, as determined by the fitness function, should
reproduce to propagate healthy genes to the next population. How this is determined
can once again be done in numerous ways. In the case of neural networks, The fitter
parent can be more likely to pass on its node and connection layout to its children,
while the less fit parent has a smaller chance, but a chance nonetheless. This is
because genetic diversity is usually beneficial in promoting the survival of a species,
which is the core idea in genetic algorithms as well.
2.2.4 Mutation
Finally, there must be a way for genomes to change and mutate. Time and
time again in nature, the tiniest mutations to a species’ genome end up having major
impacts to their ability to survive and thrive. Without a chance for new solutions
to appear, stagnation will overtake the population of machine learning models and
they will never improve. Each time classifier pairs reproduce, the offspring should
have a chance to mutate and alter the very genes it inherited from its parents. In
the case of neural networks, a mutation can be as simple as a change in the weights
between connections to growing a new node or connection altogether. Once again, the
definition of mutation will heavily depend on the technique being used.
2.2.5 Behavior
Once all of these methods have been defined and implemented, the genetic
algorithm will behave as follows. There will be an initial population of a machine
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learning technique of choice, for example, a neural network. The goal of the algorithm
will be to optimize the neural network population such that it solves a desired problem
efficiently. Performance of each neural network will be measured by the defined fitness
function, which will allow natural selection to take place and select the fittest members
to reproduce. Species will be determined from the population of neural networks and
those within the species will reproduce with each other to crossover their genes, with an
emphasis on the fittest members. Some of the newly offspring will undergo mutation
and may end up as an entirely new species. All of the offspring are considered the next
generation and the genetic algorithm process begins again. All of these definitions,
such as mutation rates, fitness function, and crossover method can be considered
hyperparameters and can be fine tuned to further improve performance [14].
2.3 Previous Work
The authors of [15] proposed using a K-Means clustering algorithm to group
malware together based on their features. They would then employ a genetic algorithm
guided boosting process in order to further refine their results. Clusters or regions
that do not meet a minimum accuracy threshold are discarded. However, as they are
using a clustering algorithm, explicit malware classification is not guaranteed. Our
research aims to use a genetic algorithm to directly optimize a malware classifier using
a machine learning model.
In [16], the authors proposed using genetic algorithms for discriminatory feature
selection. These features will be used in a machine learning model in order to classify
Android based malware. By utilizing this method, they manage to minimize feature
dimensionality and maintain a classification accuracy of more than 94%. Our research
aims to utilize genetic algorithms to explicitly optimize a machine learning classifier,
not just the feature set.
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The authors of [17] proposed using a genetic algorithm to optimize a decision
tree classifier for detecting malware. They focused on worms and Trojan horses for
their malware families, and continuously trained their model to build up a malware
profile. By having the genetic algorithm update and adjust the weights of the decision
tree, the authors intended to develop a system that would not fail when presented
with an unseen malware sample. Our research intends to implement their proposed
system using NEAT as the genetic algorithm. Not only will we test using a decision
tree as the classifier, we will also attempt to integrate genetic algorithms with neural
networks.
In [18], the authors took an entirely different approach with genetic algorithms,
and instead use them to evolve malware to evade detection. This process can be used
to generate adversarial examples for training malware classifiers. In their experiments,
the generated examples achieved up to "82% of cross-evasion rates."
The authors in [19] appear to take this a step further and allow for the creation
of new malware entirely. By integrating the concepts of crossover and mutation
operators for virus evolution, this suggests that two different viruses can pass fit genes
to create a new generation of viruses that are even harder to detect. It would be
interesting to utilize this system with our research in order to create an adversarial
system in which a classifier constantly evolves to detect malware while the malware
also evolves to evade detection.
2.4 Neuro-Evolution of Augmenting Topologies
In general genetic algorithms focused mainly on updating the weights within a
machine learning model, while the actual structure, such as the amount of nodes and
layers in a neural network, required manual input. This neural network structure is
referred to as a topology. In some cases, an incorrect topology would lead to poor
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results, requiring scientists to make educated guesses on how to alter the structure.
This proved to be costly as randomly trying various topologies would take too much
time and resources. To address this issue, the authors of [20] proposed the Neuro-
Evolution of Augmenting Topologies algorithm (NEAT).
The NEAT algorithm mimics the old adage of putting a million monkeys in
a room full of typewriters with the inevitability of one monkey eventually typing
out the works of William Shakespeare. NEAT begins by initializing a population of
classifiers, such as neural networks, with randomized weights. As each are trained,
tested, and scored for fitness, the best are chosen to crossover and speciate, similar to
normal genetic algorithms. However, NEAT differs from the standard in 5 specific
areas: minimal structure initialization, historical marking crossover, genetic encoding,
speciation, and fitness sharing.
Firstly, NEAT emphasizes the importance of starting from the absolute minimum
topology necessary. Using neural networks for example, this usually results in an input
layer and and output layer, possibly fully connected. As classifiers mutate and evolve
during NEAT, weights can change, connections can arise between nodes, and even
new nodes can be formed in the process. Given enough time, every possible topology
can be explored, but with a minimalistic start, it is most likely that a solution with a
smaller topology is explored first.
Before mutation and crossover can occur, there must first be a way to encode a
classifier that allows for the necessary swapping of genes and traits. NEAT encodes
each genome as a list of nodes and connection genes in the case of neural networks.
The list of nodes includes every unique node in the network, and the connection genes
detail the edges between nodes. Data such as the connected nodes, the weight, and
whether a connection is enabled or disabled. During mutation, weights may change,
but new connections or even nodes can be created. These mutations are tracked by an
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innovation number, that is a sort of global ordering system that organizes mutations.
Next, NEAT employs a system that allows two genomes to crossover and repro-
duce. This is done by comparing the node and connection history of the two networks
and using the innovation number to determine which genes are shared, and which are
different. Once established, the genomes are merged together with the fitter parent’s
genes overwriting the lesser in cases of overlapping genes. This provides a way for
genomes to consistently improve as they evolve.
However, there is a possibility that a particular strategy may require some time to
reach its potential. NEAT provides a way to protect these weaker strategies through
speciation. By comparing two genomes together, a distance is calculated between
them that determines how different they are. Genomes that are within a certain
distance threshold are classified as the same species.
Generally, classifiers are compared against members of their own species as
opposed to those in other species. This allows niche or complex strategies to evolve
between themselves instead of competing with earlier dominating strategies. With the
concept of fitness sharing, the strongest member of a species is found by comparing
all of their fitnesses and finding the maximum. This champion is usually stored as
the highest performing sample, and will be used to ensure that its genes will always
be passed to the next generation.
In the end, NEAT promotes neural networks keeping minimalistic topologies
while also allowing for the exploration of all possible orientations given enough time
to train and mutate. If there is a simpler optimal solution to the problem, NEAT will
tend to discover it before any solution with a more robust structure. According to
authors of [20], “NEAT strengthens the analogy between GAs and natural evolution




In this section, we will discuss how the features are extracted from the data,
the proposed experiments we will be running on the data, and the machine learning
pipeline for our experiments. We will be using 4 distinct malware families of 1000
samples each. The families will be paired up and compared against the other in
our tests. Once gathered, the data will have their opcodes extracted. Opcodes are
extracted directly from malware executables and stored in order in a text file.
3.1 Feature Extraction
The top 29 assembly opcodes will be selected from the malware samples based on
frequency. Opcodes not part of these 29 will be classified as other, creating a 30th
feature. These opcodes are extracted from the malware executable files. This data
will be labeled by family, represented as an array, and stored in a file.
3.2 Proposed Experiments
This section will be presenting a high level overview of our proposed experiments.
In general, we will be training various malware classification models using the NEAT
algorithm to optimize performance. The proposed classification models are a deci-
sion tree, a standard feed-forward neural network, and a recurrent neural network.
The performances of these models will be compared against standard classification
techniques as a baseline. These techniques are random forest classifiers and support
vector machines. The main metric we will be evaluating on is model accuracy, and
the results will include the confusion matrix.
3.3 Machine Learning Pipeline
In this section, we will cover the step-by-step machine learning process for each
experiment, including selecting the subset of features, processing the data, training
and testing, and evaluating the model performance using metrics.
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3.3.1 Feature Selection
From the malware samples, the top 29 opcodes are gathered based on frequency,
while the other opcodes are grouped under the “other” category, providing 30 key
features. Each malware family is its own class, and we classify between two classes.
3.3.2 Data Preprocessing
We will be processing the data in two distinct ways. The first is by representing
the data as an array of frequency percentages for each of the top 30 opcodes. This
allows both small and large files to be represented equally as a histogram of the
opcodes, similar to the concept of a bag of words in Natural Language Processing [21].
This form of data will be used in the experiments for the NEAT-Decision Tree model
and the NEAT-Feed-Forward-NN model.
However, this method of data processing destroys the sequence of opcodes in
the malware, erasing the presence of possible malware signatures. In an attempt to
preserve and learn from this information, we also represent each file as an array of the
first 2000 opcodes from the sample. Each opcode is encoded as a number from 0-28,
with the “other” category being assigned the value 29. This can allow our models to
detect malware signatures, hopefully improving detection rates. However, this method
also has the drawback of being influenced by the size of the sample. Some malware
samples can have hundreds of thousands of opcodes, and the virus’s signature is not
guaranteed to be contained within the first 2000 features.
3.3.3 Classification and Evaluation
We use 5-fold cross validation to remove bias from the results of our experiments.
This helps in avoiding overfitting. 5-fold cross validation involves splitting the dataset
into five parts, and utilizing each part as the testing set with the others as the training




In this chapter, we present a brief summary of the malware families and the data
sets used in our research, as well as the specific packages used in our project. We will
also go over the specific types of experiments we will be running on both the NEAT
models and the base models.
4.1 Dataset and Malware Families
The experiments mainly involve distinguishing between two families of malware.
The malware families include Vobfus and ZBot from the Malicia data set [22], as well
as Obfuscator and Onlinegames from an external data set used in another paper [23].
Vobfus and ZBot serve as the default families being classified, while Obfuscator and
Onlinegames were selected as a more challenging pair of malware families to classify.
We selected 1000 samples from each family to serve as our data set. The table shows
the 4 families as well as a description of what type of malware they are.
Vobfus is a worm type malware known to spread through infected drives [24].
The malware takes advantage of the auto run feature in most computers to activate it.
It will then connect to servers to download malicious code onto the victim’s machine.
The malware can continue spreading through the same infected drives as well as any
new drives infected by new malware copies.
ZBot is a Trojan horse type malware known to spread through emails or malicious
websites [25]. Once a victim’s machine is infected, the malware will attempt to discover
personal information such as bank account information, log in credentials, or security
details. It will then use this information to make unauthorized money transfers from
the victim’s accounts to the hackers’.
Obfuscator is a Trojan horse type malware that is usually spread through spam
emails and phishing attempts [26]. Upon infecting a victim’s machine, it can perform
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a variety of attacks. It can monitor user activity to send sensitive information to the
hackers. It can also pretend to be an actual system process and attempt to take over
the machine to lock out the user.
OnlineGames is a keylogger Trojan horse type malware that is usually spread
though spam emails and phishing attempts [27]. It mainly targets people who play
computer games over the internet. Once a victim’s machine is infected, the malware
spies on the user’s online activities and attempts to steal log in credentials for online
games. These credentials are sent to the hackers, and are usually sold for real world
money.
4.2 Programming Specifications
In this section, we discuss implementation-related details of our experiments. We
utilized Python to code the experiments, which were run on Windows 10. All the
data was stored on the local hard drive of the laptop used in the experiments.
After each malware sample is processed as discussed in Chapter 3, the feature
data is represented as an array and stored in a file. We used the pickle library [28] to
store this information. Pickle is a Python library that enables the serialization of data
objects for later unpacking. Pickle is used again to extract the data for further use.
This allows for not only an efficient way to store data, but also easy method to save
trained models for distribution. As stated in Chapter 3, the opcode information is
either stored as an array of histogram frequency percentages for each malware sample,
or an array of the first 2000 opcodes in sequence.
The Scikit-learn library [29] was used for its wide variety of established machine
learning models, several of which were used as a baseline model to compare against.
Specifically, we used the random forest classifier and support vector machine libraries
included in Scikit-learn. These are popular classifiers used in malware detection and
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provide a good representation of current classification systems.
The pandas library [30] was used for its data frame object, which allowed for easy
data loading and management. This was necessary to utilize Scikit-learn’s train test
split function, which automated both 5-fold cross validation and dividing data into a
training and testing set.
The NEAT-python library was used for its implementation of the NEAT algorithm
with neural networks [31]. By default, the library allows for the use of a feed-forward
or a recurrent neural network as its main classifier. Many of the hyperparameters
such as mutation rate and structural design are easily edited using a configuration file
as well. This package allowed for a relatively smooth implementation of NEAT into a
malware classifier.
In order to incorporate NEAT with a decision tree classifier, we utilized an open
source implementation of NEAT maintained by a computer science YouTube content
creator known as Code Bullet [32]. Their implementation exposed much of the inner
mechanisms of NEAT and allowed us to customize many aspects of the algorithm in
order for it to work with decision trees.
4.3 Experimental Design
In this section, we discuss the specific experiments we will be running on our
classification models. The main metric of success we will be using is validation
accuracy, demonstrated by the confusion matrix for each test. The results will be
obtained by a standard 5-fold cross validation training and testing on our selected
data, where the performance of our NEAT models will be compared against the base
models. As discussed earlier, we have three NEAT model implementations using a
decision tree, a feed-forward neural network, and a recurrent neural network, and our
base models are a random forest classifier and support vector machines.
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We will also be observing the run time complexity of the NEAT model in contrast
to the base models. As NEAT takes in parameters such as population size and
generation size, we will attempt to find the best setting that maximizes performance




In this chapter, we discuss the results and analysis of the experiments performed on
the the NEAT-Decision Tree Model, the NEAT-Feed Forward Neural Network Model,
and the NEAT-Recurrent Neural Network model. We compare their performance
against the base models of decision trees, random forest, and SVMs. All models are
evaluated on accuracy and run time complexity. The four malware families described
in Chapter 4 are paired up as Vobfus and Zbot, and Obfuscator and OnlineGames, to
create two binary class problems.
5.1 NEAT Decision Tree
In this section, we go over the results obtained from testing the NEAT Decision
Tree. As discussed, this model was custom built using an open source implementation
of NEAT. As such, we begin by explaining the particular features unique to our
implementation of this model. Specifically, we discuss implementation details regarding
fitness, speciation, crossover, and mutation.
5.1.1 Fitness
As mentioned in Chapter 2, fitness is the score we give each classifier in order
to determine which decision tree performs better. In this case, we chose to base the
fitness score on accuracy. Specifically, we multiplied the accuracy by 100, squared
the result, and added 1 to prevent cases of 0 fitness. We chose this method of fitness
calculation in order to magnify any slight changes in accuracy, and allow for small
improvements over time. For example, an accuracy of 0.7 would result in a fitness
score of 4901.
5.1.2 Speciation
Another important issue is how to determine a decision tree’s genome and whether
they are close enough to be in the same species. To simplify this process, we set the
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maximum depth for decision trees to 2. In these experiments, we use the bag of words
method of representing malware as discussed in Chapter 3. Each node has an opcode
and a percentage threshold between 0 and 1. If a malware sample has a percentage
value less than the threshold for that particular opcode, it will traverse the left branch,
and will traverse the right branch otherwise. The initial population of decision trees
have randomized opcode and threshold values.
Decision tree genomes are represented by the features of each of its nodes, and
decision trees with similar enough genomes are classified as the same species. We
determine genome similarity by seeing whether both decision trees share the root node
feature and at least one child node feature. For example, if one decision tree has
a root feature of add, and child features of push and sub, while another has a root
feature of add, and child features of mul and push, those two decision trees would
be classified in the same species. On the other hand, if one decision tree has a root
feature of add and another had a root feature of mul, those would be classified as
different species, even if they both have child features of other and mov.
5.1.3 Crossover
Our implementation of reproduction between two decision trees involves the
direct passing of nodes to the offspring decision tree. The child is a direct clone of the
fitter parent 35% of the time. There is a 25% chance for each of the less fit parent’s
children nodes to be passed on to the child. Otherwise, the child will be a direct clone
of the less fit parent. These percentages and the overall implementation of crossover
is one of many possible implementations of crossover. Testing other implementations
is out of the scope of this project.
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5.1.4 Mutation
Each node in the decision tree has a 40% chance of undergoing mutation, leading
to a 78.4% chance of the decision tree undergoing at least one mutation. Within
the nodes themselves, 30% of the time, mutation will occur on the value it decides
on. The value will be modified by a randomly chosen decimal with a Gaussian
distribution about 0 with a standard deviation of 0.03. This usually results in either
an addition or subtraction of a value between 0 and 0.15. The slight adjustment to
the value of a decision node is meant to allow the fine tuning of decision boundaries
as generations pass. 5% of the time, the decision node will mutate an entirely random
threshold value and the remaining 5% results in a mutation in a random new feature.
This implementation of mutation may not be optimal, but testing other mutation
implementations is also out of the scope of this project.
5.1.5 Results
For the NEAT Decision Tree (NDT), we used a random forest classifier (RF)
as the base model for comparison. The NDT was trained for 50 generations with a
population size of 250 for a starting level. Later on, we experiment with different
values to test run time optimization. The RF model has a maximum depth of 2 to
match the NDT, with 100 estimators.
On the Vobfus and Zbot families, the average accuracy of 5 fold cross validation
testing for NDT was 95.45%. On the other hand, RF had an average accuracy of 98%.
Table 1 displays confusion matrices for each model.
It appears that accuracy wise, the performance across both models is relatively
similar, only differing by a few percentage points. This suggests that NDT can perform
as well as similar traditional models, and may perform better with enough optimization.
However, the biggest difference between NDT and RF was that it took much longer
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Table 1: Confusion Matrices for Vobfus and Zbot
Table 1.A Confusion Matrix for NDT
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 191 11
True Zbot 6 192
Table 1.B Confusion Matrix for RF
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 180 6
True Zbot 8 206
Table 2: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Vobfus and Zbot





to train. RF took only seconds to run while NDT took at least 3 times as long. This
led us to conduct optimization experiments on population and generation size to see
if favorable trade offs can be made in accuracy. The results are shown in Table 2.
As expected, lowering either the generation or population size had a negative
effect on the model’s accuracy. However, the overall loss was relatively small in
comparison to the speed up in run time. By halving the population size to 125 and
the generation size to 25, we achieved an accuracy of 91.25% and reduced run time 4
fold. This provides the option of prioritizing speed over model performance.
However, these two families appear to be relatively easy to separate; with scores
above 90% accuracy, it is difficult to notice meaningful improvement between the
subjects. In response, we selected the families of Obfuscator and OnlineGames as a
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more challenging data set to separate. These families were shown in [23] to have low
classification accuracy when compared against each other. Using these families as a
binary classification problem, we ran the same experiments again.
During 5 fold cross validation, NDT scored an average accuracy of 76.6%. Com-
paratively, RF had a score of 88%. The results are displayed in Table 3. As expected,
the models performed noticeably worse on this new challenging data set, with all
models dropping around 10% accuracy or higher. Most notably, NDT is performing
noticeably worse than the base models while maintaining the increased run time.
However, the decrease in performance can most likely be rectified with fine tuning of
hyperparameters; it still performs much better than random guessing. We also ran
optimization experiments on population and generation size on this data set as well,
with the results listed in Table 4.
Table 3: Confusion Matrices for Obfuscator and OnlineGames
Table 3.A Confusion Matrix for NDT
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 168 34
True OnlineGames 46 152
Table 3.B Confusion Matrix for RF
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 173 13
True OnlineGames 33 181
Table 4: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Obfuscator and OnlineGames






Surprisingly, the decrease in accuracy stayed relatively the same as the first
optimization experiments. With a population size of 12 and a generation size of
25, we achieved an accuracy of 71.5%, which is only a 5% decrease from our cross
validation results. With enough fine tuning and adjustments, acceptable accuracy
may be achieved with minimal run time.
In conclusion, NDT is a viable malware classification strategy and has potential
to evolve to detect malware utilizing obfuscation strategies. With these experiments
completed, we elected to advance our model from decision trees to neural networks to
see how more complex models interact with NEAT.
5.2 NEAT Feed Forward Neural Network
In this section, we go over the results obtained from testing the NEAT Feed
Forward Neural Network (NFFNN). As discussed, this model utilizes the NEAT-
Python library [31] to implement NEAT. The model we compare NFFNN against is
the support vector machine (SVM) provided by the Scikit-Learn library [29]. Like
the previous experiments, our data set consists of two family pairs: Vobfus and Zbot,
and Obfuscator and OnlineGames. NEAT-Python runs off of a configuration file
that stores the hyperparameter values used in the model. Figure 1 shows a portion
of the configuration file used in our experiments. We use the same fitness function
as described earlier in our NDT experiments. First, we run a standard 5-fold cross
validation on both data sets for both models and compare results. Then, we perform
run time optimization experiments on parameters of population and generation size.
For the 5-fold cross validation testing, NFFNN ran a population of 256 for 128
generations. NFFNN managed to score an average accuracy of 96.1% for the Vobfus
and Zbot pair. On the other hand, SVM scored an average accuracy of 95%. Table 5
displays the confusion matrices for each model.
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Figure 1: A Selection of Hyperparameters from the NEAT Config File
Table 5: Confusion Matrices for Vobfus and Zbot
Table 5.A Confusion Matrix for NFFNN
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 193 7
True Zbot 9 191
Table 5.B Confusion Matrix for SVM
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 200 9
True Zbot 7 184
Accuracy wise, both models perform quite well in distinguishing these two malware
families; there is little difference between them. This supports NEAT as a viable
method to optimize classifiers for malware detection. Further optimization may
produce even better results. Figure 2 shows a visualization of a top performing Neural
Network generated by NEAT. The rectangles represent inputs and the two nodes
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with class names are the outputs. Nodes in between were generated through random
mutation and evolution, and edges are randomly disabled and enabled as well.
Figure 2: A Winning Neural Network Generated by NEAT
However, as with our previous experiments with NDT, run time is an issue with
NFFNN. SVM was able to complete its results within a few seconds while NFFNN
took nearly 5 minutes. This led us to experiment with optimizing the population and
generation size parameters. The results are shown in Table 6. In addition to tracking
accuracy, we measure the average time in seconds for a single generation to complete.
By multiplying the time by the total number of generations, a total run time can be
calculated.
Surprisingly, the accuracy of NFFNN stays relatively stable despite having
decreased both population and generation size four fold. With this, NFFNN finishes
running within seconds, comparable to the speed of SVMs with similar performance.
However, with such low parameter values, NFFNN is highly vulnerable to high
variance in performance. For example, one of the strengths of NEAT lies in having a
large enough population size to explore most possible solutions. Figure 3 displays the
speciation during one run through of the NFFNN.
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Table 6: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Vobfus and Zbot
Population Size Generation Size Accuracy Average Generation Time
256 128 0.9600 2.104
128 128 0.9525 1.120
64 128 0.9650 0.516
32 128 0.9425 0.281
256 64 0.9625 2.560
128 64 0.9675 1.225
64 64 0.9500 0.682
32 64 0.9575 0.212
256 32 0.9600 2.504
128 32 0.9425 1.032
64 32 0.9625 0.411
32 16 0.9475 0.207
256 16 0.9450 2.486
128 16 0.9550 1.018
64 16 0.9500 0.546
32 16 0.9375 0.202
Each different color represents a different species. Some species are unable to
improve and go extinct, while others dominate the field. By having so many different
species, many solutions can be explored and the fittest will survive to reproduce. On
the other hand, while lowering population size can improve run time, it can also
prevent winning solutions from being created and tested, leading to lower performance.
This can be seen in Figure 4.
As seen in this figure, with such a low population size, the number of different
species drops significantly; in this case only 4 species arose, and 2 became extinct fairly
quickly. This may not be an issue in situations where the data is easier to separate.
In this example, it appears as if a strong solution was found immediately, which was
why it dominated over the rest. However, in more difficult problems, there may not
be enough genetic diversity to discover an optimal solution.
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Figure 3: NEAT Species Visualization for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 256
The other parameter tested in our experiments was generation size, which is
another major contributor to the run time of our model. More generations allow
species within the model more opportunities to mutate and evolve, fine tuning the
weights towards a more optimal solution. In the case of classifying between Vobfus
and Zbot, a strong solution tends to appear quite quickly. Figure 5 displays the fitness
graph during one run through of the NFFNN.
In this graph there are several lines showing various fitness metrics, but the most
important one is the line showing the best fitness, as this species will be selected as the
winner. In this case, the best fitness starts at around 6400 which translates to about
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Figure 4: NEAT Species Visualization for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 32
80% accuracy based on our fitness function as mentioned in our NDT experiments.
This quickly rises to over 9000 which corresponds to around 95% accuracy, matching
earlier results. Once this peak is reached, little improvement to fitness is seen.
With these results, it is apparent that further generations beyond 20 serve only
to increase run time with little return on investment. Finding an ideal generation size
which maximizes fitness improvement is key in reaching an optimal model. However,
reducing generation size by too much can result in species not having enough time to
evolve and refine their strategy. Figure 6 displays the fitness graph of a model with
generation size of 16.
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Figure 5: Fitness Graph for Vobfus and Zbot: Generation Size of 128
Here, the best fitness line behaves similarly to that in figure 5; it rapidly reaches
over 90% accuracy. However, the accuracy does not reach quite as high and may have
improved with more time. Also, had the generation size been lower, the model would
not have had enough time to improve.
All in all, NFFNN performs very similarly to SVMs when classifying between
Vobfus and Zbot. The major difference was that NFFNN required more time to
run in general, but in this case, lower population and generation size were viable
solutions. However, these are still relatively easy families to distinguish. Different
results may arise when dealing with more difficult families. To address this, we
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Figure 6: Fitness Graph for Vobfus and Zbot: Generation Size of 16
run the experiments again using the more challenging data set of Obfuscator and
OnlineGames.
Once again, NFFNN ran a population of 256 for 128 generations for the 5-fold
cross validation testing. For Obfuscator and OnlineGames, NFFNN managed to score
an average accuracy of 82.25%. Comparatively, SVM scored an average accuracy of
74%. Table 7 displays the confusion matrices for each model.
Surprisingly, in this case NFFNN performed decidedly better than SVMs, by
about 10%. This is the first time a NEAT model has performed so much better than
a base model. This suggests that the random evolution provided by NEAT can adapt
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Table 7: Confusion Matrices for Obfuscator and OnlineGames
Table 7.A Confusion Matrix for NFFNN
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 177 46
True OnlineGames 25 152
Table 7.B Confusion Matrix for SVM
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 174 35
True OnlineGames 45 146
to subtle differences in malware family better than standard SVMs. Of course, the
SVM implementation we use in our experiments is by no means fully optimized for
malware detection. However, this is a promising sign as our NFFNN can also benefit
from fine tuning and adjustment as well. However, as discussed before NFFNN falls
far behind in terms of run time. We conduct optimization experiments on population
and generation size like before. The results are displayed in Table 8.
In these experiments, the trade offs between run time and model performance
become much more apparent. On average, the accuracy stays around the 80% mark
throughout all testing. However, as we approach lower and lower population and
generation sizes, model performance becomes less consistent, occasionally dropping as
low as 73%. Though this is still comparable to the performance of SVMs, it is a large
drop from the peak performance of 84%.
This may be due to the issues brought up in the optimization experiments
performed on Vobfus and Zbot. With a lower population size, there is not enough
genetic diversity to explore solutions, and with a smaller number of generations, the
species present do not have enough time to evolve. This is can be seen in Figure 7
and Figure 8.
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Table 8: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Obfuscator and OnlineGames
Population Size Generation Size Accuracy Average Generation Time
256 128 0.8375 2.327
128 128 0.7925 1.084
64 128 0.8000 0.550
32 128 0.8425 0.253
256 64 0.8150 2.288
128 64 0.8175 1.096
64 64 0.8075 0.454
32 64 0.7900 0.254
256 32 0.8175 2.110
128 32 0.7975 1.169
64 32 0.7825 0.604
32 16 0.8050 0.298
256 16 0.8175 2.252
128 16 0.7975 1.008
64 16 0.7825 0.434
32 16 0.8050 0.203
Here, only 5 species were able to emerge with a population size of 32. Though all
managed to avoid extinction, there were not enough species to fully explore optimal
solutions. In the fitness graph the best fitness line made large jumps in progress, but
due to a short generation time, its progress was halted before it reached a maximum.
This is due to the strength of NEAT lying in large population and generation
sizes. If these are too small, there is not enough genetic diversity or time to evolve,
and the model suffers. Below are a few graphs displaying the fitness growth as the
model trains. Though we achieved the goal reducing run time, there were heavy
concessions made in terms of accuracy.
In conclusion, NFFNN was able to reach 84% accuracy when classifying between
the Obfuscator and OnlineGames families, compared to 74% scored by SVMs. This
is a significant improvement, but it was offset by the large increase in run time.
Experiments to reduce run time by lowering population and generation size resulted in
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Figure 7: NEAT Species Visualization for Obfuscator and OnlineGames: Population
Size of 32
noticeable decreases in performance. These results suggest that NFFNN has potential
to become a strong malware classifier with enough resources and fine tuning. Next, we
explore using a NEAT recurrent neural network model to classify based on malware
opcode sequences.
5.3 NEAT Recurrent Neural Network
In this section, we go over our final model, the NEAT Recurrent Neural Network
(NRNN). This model also utilizes the NEAT-Python library [31]. We again use
Scikit-Learn’s implementation of SVMs as a comparison model [29], and we utilize the
same malware family pairs as previously. NRNN utilizes a similar configuration file to
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Figure 8: Fitness Graph for Obfuscator and OnlineGames: Generation Size of 16
NFFNN with minor adjustments to the inputs to fit an RNN. In this experiment, the
first 2000 opcodes of each malware are stored as an array and passed in as input. This
is to test whether sequential information can help in detecting malware. The same
fitness function is used for NRNN. First, we run a standard 5-fold cross validation
on both data sets for both models and compare results. Then, we perform run time
optimization experiments on parameters of population and generation size.
For the 5-fold cross validation testing, NRNN ran a population of 128 for 64
generations. NRNN managed to score an average accuracy of 94.25% for the Vobfus
and Zbot pair. On the other hand, SVM scored an average accuracy of 98%. Table 9
displays the confusion matrices for each model.
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Both models score relatively well, with SVMs scoring 4% higher than NRNN.
This can be due to randomness and can be resolved through fine tuning. However,
NRNN takes much more time to run compared to SVMs, as the RNN has to process
2000 inputs. This led us to try optimization experiments in order to minimize run
time. The results are displayed in Table 10.
Table 9: Confusion Matrices for Vobfus and Zbot
Table 9.A Confusion Matrix for NRNN
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 194 8
True Zbot 8 190
Table 9.B Confusion Matrix for SVM
Predicted Vobfus Predicted Zbot
True Vobfus 197 0
True Zbot 5 198
Table 10: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Vobfus and Zbot
Population Size Generation Size Accuracy Average Generation Time
128 64 0.9600 39.792
64 64 0.9600 27.810
32 64 0.9650 13.844
128 32 0.9700 46.921
64 32 0.9400 26.496
32 32 0.9400 17.158
128 16 0.9700 49.561
64 16 0.7825 27.089
32 16 0.7525 11.138
In these experiments, NRNN maintains its performance relatively well, but
experiences a large decrease in accuracy at the smallest generation and population
sizes. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the fitness and speciation graphs for the experiment
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with population size 32 and generation size 16. Here we notice that the best fitness
starts out quite low, and gradually increases. However, as the generation time was
so short, it did not have enough time to fully optimize itself. As there were only a
total of 4 species overall, this could be due to all species initializing with sub optimal
weights, and struggling to improve with the genes present. Compared to Figure 11
and Figure 12, which has a population size of 128 and generation size of 32, the model
managed to quickly correct its low starting fitness, most likely due to larger genetic
diversity.
Figure 9: Fitness Graph for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 32 and Generation
Size of 16
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Figure 10: NEAT Species Visualization for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 32
and Generation Size of 16
All in all, these experiments show that population size may be the more important
parameter to keep high. In cases of low population, the initial species can start out
with poor weights that drastically slow improvement. Higher population models were
able to more quickly mutate away from the sub optimal weights and reach higher
accuracy. On the other hand, a longer generation size provides more opportunity for
a model to correct itself. However, higher populations evolve quickly enough that
lowering generation size to minimize run time may result in comparably high accuracy
scores.
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Figure 11: Fitness Graph for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 128 and Generation
Size of 32
Finally, we perform the same 5-fold cross validation experiments on the more
challenging data set of Obfuscator and OnlineGames, with population size 128 and
generation size 64. NRNN scored an average of 70.65% while SVMs scored an average
of 82%. The confusion matrices are provided in Table 11.
In this case, NRNN performed about 10% worse than SVMs, while still maintaining
a higher run time cost. We perform population size and generation size optimization
experiments once more to observe its behavior. Table 12 displays the results.
Here, attempts to reduce run time heavily cut into the performance of NRNN,
dropping almost 20% at the lowest settings. This suggests that with families that are
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Figure 12: NEAT Species Visualization for Vobfus and Zbot: Population Size of 128
and Generation Size of 32
Table 11: Confusion Matrices for Obfuscator and OnlineGames
Table 11.A Confusion Matrix for NRNN
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 148 44
True OnlineGames 68 140
Table 11.B Confusion Matrix for SVM
Predicted Obfuscator Predicted OnlineGames
True Obfuscator 173 24
True OnlineGames 25 178
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Table 12: Population and Generation Size Experiments for Obfuscator and On-
lineGames
Population Size Generation Size Accuracy Average Generation Time
128 64 0.7475 60.714
64 64 0.6700 21.506
32 64 0.7775 11.702
128 32 0.7350 40.211
64 32 0.6225 19.435
32 32 0.6275 9.584
128 16 0.6575 35.953
64 16 0.6775 18.305
32 16 0.5725 12.052
difficult to classify, high population and generation size is necessary to take advantage
of NEAT’s properties of evolution. Figure 13 and Figure 14 are the fitness and
speciation graphs for population size of 32 and generation size of 16.
Once again, there are only 4 distinct species, and the best fitness starts at about
3200, which translates to about 56% accuracy. The fitness slowly improves but does
not have enough time to optimize further.
All in all, NRNN performed comparatively to SVMs in the case of an easy data
set, but fell behind when presented with a more challenging data set. Perhaps with
more tuning, the performance can improve. However, the long run time of NRNN
continues to be the main drawback when compared to traditional malware detection
methods.
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Figure 13: Fitness Graph for Obfuscator and OnlineGames: Population Size of 32
and Generation Size of 16
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Figure 14: NEAT Species Visualization for Obfuscator and OnlineGames: Population
Size of 32 and Generation Size of 16
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have used opcode features to examine how genetic algorithms
can optimize machine learning models for malware detection. Specifically, we used
the NEAT algorithm to augment decision trees, feed forward neural networks, and
recurrent neural networks, and compared their performance against random forest
classifiers and support vector machines. We used two pairs of malware families, one
easy and one challenging, for our data sets and ran multiple experiments measuring
accuracy and run time.
NDT was able to perform relatively well when compared to RF; both scored
above 90% accuracy on the Vobfus and Zbot data set, but performed noticeably
worse on the Obfuscator and OnlineGames data set. The main difference with NDT
was its increased run time compared to RF. Through optimization experiments, we
determined that lowering population size and generation size massively reduced run
time at the cost of accuracy.
Similarly, NFFNN performed as well as SVMs on the Vobfus and Zbot families,
and managed to surpass SVMs on the more challenging Obfuscator and OnlineGames
families. This suggests that NEAT powered machine learning models have the
potential to outperform traditional models under the right circumstances. With
further fine tuning and optimization, NFFNN could maintain a high accuracy score
while minimizing run time.
NRNN maintained a high accuracy on the Vobfus and Zbot families, but struggled
on the more difficult Obfuscator and OnlineGames families when compared to SVMs;
NRNN scored almost 10% less accuracy than SVMs. Further experiments with lowered
population size and generation size revealed the necessity of genetic diversity for neural
network evolution; when the population size is too low, species can initialize with poor
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weights and stagnate with minimal improvement. Generation size, though it provides
more opportunities for species to mutate towards stronger solutions, can usually be
kept low in favor of a higher population size.
In conclusion, genetic algorithms have the potential to create effective machine
learning models under the right circumstances. NEAT powered malware detection
models tended to perform as well as more traditional models, and occasionally per-
formed better. The concept of evolution in machine learning may be the key when
dealing with malware that constantly changes to avoid detection.
6.1 Future Work
In this research we worked with a data set of malware files from known families.
To our knowledge, these files were not obfuscated, nor did they change over time.
If we had access to malware that had gone through stages of obfuscation at various
points in time, experiments could be run to test the robustness of a NEAT malware
classifier and its ability to evolve to detect newer versions of that malware family.
These experiments would fully test the potential of genetic algorithms. The challenge
in such a research is that metamorphic malware is quite rare in practice, and it may
be difficult to procure a large enough data set for experimentation.
The primary algorithm used in or research was NEAT, but in its most basic form.
Since its inception, other, more specialized versions of NEAT have been developed,
such as hyper NEAT [33], which is used to evolve large-scale neural networks. Testing
out these new NEAT implementations may uncover a more effective means of evolving
malware classification systems.
Our research focused on malware opcodes as the primary feature for our models.
There are numerous other features that can be used, such as byte data or n-grams ex-
tracted from malware [6]. Utilizing different features may result in better performance
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or require an entirely different implementation. The results of such experiments would
undoubtedly be useful in the research of malware detection.
Finally, while this research used decision trees and neural networks as the main
models being optimized by NEAT, many other valid models exist. It would be inter-
esting to see how NEAT interacts with different malware classifier implementations.
The challenge in such a research would be in modifying those models to be compatible
with genetic algorithms. For example, NEAT encodes neural networks in a special
way to more easily promote crossover between species. Finding ways of encoding
other model genomes will be difficult.
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